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Abstract We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in
vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we
analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically,
between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting
countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative
degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry.
With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit
an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country.
On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting
countries.
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1 Introduction
Vertical linkages play an important role in international trade, particularly in mar-
kets where firms (and ultimately consumers) rely on key intermediate inputs or raw
materials that are supplied by dominant exporters in one or a few countries. Trade
in natural resources serves as an obvious example. In a policy context, such cross-
border vertical linkages naturally lead to a conflict of interest between exporting
and importing countries. In the present paper, we develop a successive international
oligopoly model,1 where upstream oligopolist firms in two exporting countries supply
a homogenous good to downstream oligopolist firms in an importing country, where
the end-user market is located. In this context, we analyse the interaction between
vertical and horizontal rent-shifting. In other words, how the policy makers in
the exporting and importing countries may use taxes (or subsidies) strategically in
order to shift rents vertically, up or down the vertical value-chain, and horizontally,
between exporting countries. We distinguish the cases where only one or both of the
exporting countries engage in strategic trade policy.2
We believe that our model structure is sufficiently generic to fit a variety of
different industries. However, an interesting—and particularly fitting—example of
such an industry structure is the European market for natural gas. The ongoing
liberalisation of the market—through the implementation of the so-called Gas
Directive3—means that the market structure is increasingly taking the shape of a
successive oligopoly, with an oligopoly of upstream gas producers and a downstream
oligopoly of gas traders.4 Furthermore, natural gas consumption within the EU relies
heavily on supply from a small number of non-EU gas producing countries (Norway,
Russia and Algeria).5
Although international trade agreements to a certain extent may limit the avail-
ability of traditional trade policy instruments, such as export subsidies and import
tariffs, there is arguably a wide range of feasible policy instruments that may be used
for strategic trade purposes. For example, a country may adopt lax environmental
policies—as a substitute for direct subsidies—in order to strengthen the competitive
position of domestic firms vis-á-vis their foreign rivals.6 In our model, we let the
1 See e.g. Greenhut and Ohta (1979), Salinger (1988) and Ziss (2005) for standard models of
successive Cournot oligopoly.
2 The idea that imperfect competition in international markets may create incentives for strategic
trade policy has spurred a rich body of research literature over the last couple of decades. Seminal
contributions to the literature on strategic trade policy include Dixit (1984), Brander and Spencer
(1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
3 The original EU Gas Directive from 1998 specified common rules for the trade, distribution,
supply and storage of natural gas. In 2003, an amendment to the directive included further
measures to be taken in order to liberalise the European gas market. Details can be found at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/gas/index_en.htm.
4 Boots et al. (2004) model the European gas market as a successive Cournot oligopoly. However,
strategic policy issues are not looked into.
5 See e.g. Austvik (1997), Radetzki (1999) and Percebois (1999) for detailed descriptive analyses of
the European natural gas market.
6 Seminal contributions to the literature on ‘strategic environmental policy’ include Conrad (1993),
Barrett (1994) and Kennedy (1994).
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policy instrument be a tax (or subsidy) on production in the respective countries,
which can be given several different interpretations.7 In any case, the important
feature of the model is that national policy makers can use tax instruments of one or
another kind to affect equilibrium market prices, and thus the allocation of industry
rents between the countries.8
One of the main purposes of our analysis is to discuss how the degree of
competition in different parts of the industry is likely to affect the policy equilibrium.
This has important implications for competition policy and welfare effects of market
liberalisation. Given that policy makers act strategically, which country will gain
or lose from increased competition in either the upstream or downstream part of
the industry? For example, in the process of liberalising the European natural gas
market, there is a stated desire from the European Union not only to increase
downstream competition, but also to increase competition in the upstream market
by trying to break up the sales monopolies of the exporting countries.9,10 Although
downstream firms may stand to lose, this should—in principle—yield a net benefit
to the importing countries through increased supply and lower prices. But will this
necessarily be the case if the policy makers in the importing and exporting countries
engage in strategic trade policy? And how is the presence of competing exporting
countries likely to affect the results? These are some of the key questions analysed
in the paper.
Let us now sketch some of our main findings. The strategic aim of policy makers
in the exporting countries is to commit their respective countries to the Stackelberg
leader level of aggregate output. Whether the optimal policy for pursuing this aim
is a tax or a subsidy on domestic production is to a large extent determined by the
relative degree of upstream competition in the two exporting countries. In fact, for
the special case of linear demand, we show that the nature of the optimal policy is
determined only by market structure and is, furthermore, independent of foreign
7 For example, in our model (with no domestic consumption in the exporting countries), an
upstream tax on production is equivalent to an export tax, while a downstream production tax is
equivalent to an import tariff levied on the domestic firms. It is also worth noting that a consumption
tax would have similar qualitative effects as an import tariff.
8 In the natural gas example, there is also another policy instrument that may be used strategically
in order to extract foreign rents. A key component in the process of liberalising the European gas
market is the concept of ‘third-party access’ (TPA) to gas pipelines and transmission networks, where
all players have access to the transportation systems on equal non-discriminatory conditions. Since
the exporting and importing countries control different parts of the transmission network, policy
makers may have incentives to set the regulated access price strategically, thereby engaging in a
regulatory competition game, in order to shift rents up or down the value-chain. In this case, the
access price is a de facto tax instrument.
9 The major gas producer Norway—a non-EU country, but subject to the common competition leg-
islation in the European Economic Area (EEA)—reluctantly accepted to dismantle the Norwegian
gas sales monopoly (GFU) after threats of legal actions by the EU Commission.
10 Golombek et al. (1998) use a numerical model of the Western European natural gas market to
analyse supply-side responses to a more liberalised downstream industry, and find that producing
countries have an incentive to break up their sales monopolies. However, strategic trade policy, or
any form of tax competition between countries, is not an issue.
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trade policy. In general, the optimal domestic policy is a tax (subsidy) if the degree
of domestic competition is high (low) relative to the foreign exporting country.
The equilibrium downstream tax rate, on the other hand, is positive if, roughly
speaking, the downstream market is more competitive than the upstream market,
and negative otherwise. This illustrates the conflict of interest between the countries:
whereas the policy makers in the exporting countries are concerned about maximis-
ing upstream revenue net of production costs, the policy maker in the downstream
country must balance concerns for rent-extraction from the upstream part of the
industry (which requires a positive tax rate) and for stimulating competition in the
downstream part of the industry (which requires a negative tax rate).
Perhaps our most interesting results are related to the welfare effects of increased
competition in the different parts of the vertically linked industry. While the nature
of the policy equilibrium, as mentioned above, is characterised for a general demand
function, this part of the analysis relies on the assumption of linear demand. The
following main results are derived: if only one of the exporting countries engages in
strategic trade policy, increased (upstream) competition in this country will actually
benefit both exporting countries and harm the importing country in the trade policy
equilibrium. This has powerful implications for upstream competition policy. By
stimulating upstream competition, and instead use a tax instrument to restrict total
supply to the downstream market, rents are shifted up the value-chain, which benefits
the exporting countries. A similar result was shown by Cowan (1989) in a structurally
simpler model, but under more general demand assumptions.11 In this respect, we
extend Cowan’s model by introducing a downstream oligopoly in the importing
country and a second exporting (upstream) country, both of which influence policy
incentives in non-trivial ways. We show that the result is robust to the introduction
of a second exporting country, conditional on non-strategic behaviour by the policy
maker in this country. However, if both upstream policy makers act strategically,
and non-cooperatively, the result is reversed, although increased competition in both
exporting countries might benefit these countries in some special cases.
Increased downstream competition, on the other hand, is shown always to benefit
the importing country. However, contrary to the case of free trade, upstream welfare
will be reduced if downstream competition increases beyond a quite concentrated
level. Thus, in the context of our natural gas example, even if the major non-EU gas
producers like Norway and Russia retain control over their domestic competition
policies, liberalisation of the downstream European gas market may affect these
exporting countries negatively.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only paper that studies policy competi-
tion between exporting and importing countries in successive international oligopoly.
Our analysis relates closely to several strands of the international trade literature,
though. The idea of using some form of domestic taxation to extract rents from
foreign exporters with market power was first presented by Katrak (1977), and has
11 In a model with oligopolist firms in a single exporting country selling directly to consumers in
an importing country, and with an export tax and an import tariff as the policy instruments, the
equivalent result is shown to hold if demand is not too convex.
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since been elaborated on and extended in numerous papers.12 However, a common
feature in these papers is a lack of foreign policy response.13
Our paper also relates to a more recent body of contributions that explicitly model
a vertical industry structure with trade in intermediates within a context of strategic
trade policy.14 However, these analyses focus either on final-goods competition in a
third market—á la Brander and Spencer (1985)—or on domestic trade policy only,
which makes them quite different from our study.15
Finally, the present paper makes a contribution to the literature on the inter-
play between competition and trade policy. Much of this research focuses on the
substitutability of strategic trade and merger policies, and the question of whether
trade liberalisation will induce laxer competition policies.16 We complement this
literature by analysing the interaction of different policy incentives in vertically
linked industries. A novel finding is that strategic use of tax policies may increase
the conflict of interest, with respect to competition policies, between exporting and
importing countries.
2 Model
Consider an industry with two vertically related activities. There are a number of
independent upstream producers of a homogenous good located in two exporting
countries. We let m1 and m2 be the number of upstream firms in countries 1 and
2, respectively. The upstream firms are supplying n independent (and identical)
downstream distributors in country D, where the good is consumed.17 We want
to portray a situation where downstream firms are dependent on key inputs from
upstream suppliers in one or a few countries, where domestic consumption of inputs
12 See, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1981, 1984), Bergstrom (1982), Brander and Djajic (1983),
Hillman and Templeman (1985) and Lahiri and Ono (1999). Raimondos-Møller and Woodland
(2000) derive similar results in a perfectly competitive context, but where the trade policy game
is characterised by a sequential structure.
13 An important exception is Brander and Spencer (1984), who include foreign policy in an analysis
of optimal domestic tariff policy for extracting rents from a foreign oligopoly. However, the foreign
policy instrument is taken to be the degree of ‘cartelisation’ only, with the implication that complete
cartelisation is the optimal policy when foreign consumption of the good is negligible. However,
by equipping the foreign policy maker with the power also to tax, the exact opposite conclusion is
reached.
14 See, e.g., Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Ziss (1997), Bernhofen (1997), Ishikawa and Lee (1997),
Ishikawa and Spencer (1999), Hokari et al. (2003) and Chang and Sugeta (2004).
15 Of the aforementioned papers, Ishikawa and Lee (1997) and Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) are
perhaps the most closely related, in the sense that they consider a successive Cournot oligopoly
similar to ours. However, besides the fact that these papers consider domestic trade policy only,
there is a marked difference from the present paper in the types of international market structures
that are analysed.
16 In addition to the aforementioned paper by Cowan, important contributions include Auquier
and Caves (1979), Dixit (1984), Richardson (1999), Horn and Levinsohn (2001), Huck and Konrad
(2004).
17 Alternatively, we can think of the upstream activity as the production of a homogenous inter-
mediate good which is transformed into a homogenous final good by downstream firms at constant
marginal costs.
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in the exporting countries is typically negligible, compared with their export volumes.
Thus, to simplify and keep the analysis clearly focused, we assume that there is no
consumption of the good in the exporting countries.18
The downstream firms acquire the good from the upstream market at a per-unit
wholesale price w and supply the final consumers at a per-unit retail price P. Letting
qk denote output by downstream firm k, end demand for the good (in the importing
country) is given by the inverse retail demand function P (Q), which is assumed to
be strictly decreasing and twice differentiable, where Q := ∑nk=1 qk. The upstream
firms produce the good at a constant marginal production cost c. Letting x ji denote
output by firm j in country i, total output supplied in the upstream industry is given
by X := ∑2i=1
∑mi
j=1 x ji.
The firms compete à la Cournot at both stages of the value-chain. In line with
the received literature on successive Cournot oligopoly, we assume that each down-
stream firm takes the wholesale price (as well as the outputs of other downstream
firms) as given when committing to an output quantity. As noted by Salinger (1988)
and others, this amounts to giving upstream producers a first-mover advantage.
Within this context, a role for strategic trade policy is created by letting the
policy makers in both exporting and importing countries use taxes (or subsidies)
strategically, in order to shift rents vertically and horizontally. The upstream and
downstream per-unit tax rates on production are given by, respectively, tUi and t
D,
i = 1, 2.
We consider the following three-stage game:
Stage 1: The policy makers in exporting and importing countries simultaneously
and independently commit to their preferred values of upstream and
downstream taxes (subsidies), respectively.
Stage 2: The upstream firms simultaneously and independently commit to the
quantities supplied to the downstream market.
Stage 3: The downstream firms simultaneously and independently commit to the
quantities supplied to the final consumers.
We look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and the game
is solved by backwards induction.
2.1 Stage 3: Downstream competition
The profit function of a downstream firm k is given by
π Dk =
(
P (Q) − w − tD) qk. (1)
Maximising Eq. 1 with respect to qk yields the first-order condition
P ′ (Q) qk + P (Q) − w − tD = 0. (2)
18 In the context of the European natural gas market, this is actually a quite accurate assumption for
one of the largest gas producers, Norway, where domestic consumption of natural gas is practically
non-existent.
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From Eq. 2 we can derive the inverse wholesale demand function, w
(
Q, n, tD
)
.
Applying symmetry, i.e., qk = Q/n, this function is given by
w
(
Q, n, tD
) = P ′ (Q) Q
n
+ P (Q) − tD. (3)
By differentiation of Eq. 3, the following comparative statics results are straightfor-
wardly obtained:
∂w (·)
∂ Q
= P
′ (Q)
[
n + 1 + β (Q)]
n
< 0, (4)
∂w (·)
∂tD
= −1, (5)
where
β (Q) := P
′′ (Q)
P ′ (Q)
Q (6)
measures the degree of concavity of retail demand. In order to ensure that in-
dustry marginal revenue is downward sloping, we assume that β (Q) > −2. This
condition also ensures that the second-order conditions in the retail stage subgame
are satisfied.19 It follows that the wholesale demand curve is downward sloping for
any downstream market structure, i.e., ∂w (·) /∂ Q < 0 for all n. For the subsequent
analysis, the following second-order derivatives of the inverse wholesale demand
function will also be useful:
∂2w (·)
∂ Q2
= P
′′ (Q)
[
n + 1 + β (Q)] + P ′ (Q) β ′ (Q)
n
, (7)
∂2w (·)
∂tD∂ Q
= 0. (8)
2.2 Stage 2: Upstream competition
The profit function for an upstream firm j in country i is given by
πUji =
(
w
(
Q, n, tD
) − c − tUi
)
x ji, j = 1, .., mi, i = 1, 2, (9)
Differentiating with respect to x ji yields the following first-order condition for up-
stream profit maximisation:
∂w (·)
∂ Q
x ji + w (·) − c − tUi = 0. (10)
Now let the equilibrium aggregate output by country i be denoted by
Xi
(
n, m1, m2, tD, tU1 .t
U
2
) :=
mi∑
j=i
x ji. (11)
19 See also Ziss (2005).
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In equilibrium, downstream demand must equal upstream supply, i.e., Q = ∑2i=1
Xi (·). Applying symmetry, i.e., x ji = Xi (·) /mi, the equilibrium outputs of the up-
stream countries are thus given by the solution to the following two-equation system:
∂w (·)
∂ Q
Xi (·)
mi
+ w (·) − c − tUi = 0, i = 1, 2, (12)
where
Q =
2∑
i=1
Xi (·) .
Now let
α (Q, n) := ∂
2w (·) /∂ Q2
∂w (·) /∂ Q Q (13)
measure the degree of concavity of wholesale demand. We assume that α (·) > −1.
This ensures that the aggregate reaction functions are downward sloping. Fur-
thermore, let si := Xi/Q denote the upstream market share of country i. By total
differentiation of Eq. 12, we can use Cramer’s Rule to derive the comparative statics
effects of taxes on output in the three countries:20
∂ Xi
∂tUi
= mi
∂w/∂ Q
(
m−i + 1 + s−iα
m1 + m2 + 1 + α
)
< 0, (14)
∂ X−i
∂tUi
= − mi
∂w/∂ Q
(
m−i + s−iα
m1 + m2 + 1 + α
)
> 0, (15)
∂ Q
∂tD
=
2∑
i=1
∂ Xi
∂tD
= 1
∂w/∂ Q
(
m1 + m2
m1 + m2 + 1 + α
)
< 0. (16)
Combining Eqs. 14 and 15, we also have that
∂ (Xi + X−i)
∂tUi
= 1
∂w/∂ Q
(
mi
m1 + m2 + 1 + α
)
< 0. (17)
Equations 14, 15, 16 and 17 summarise the effects of upstream and downstream
taxation on output and, correspondingly, wholesale and retail prices. A higher
downstream tax will induce downstream firms to reduce their outputs, which causes
an increase in the final price, P. However, such a tax increase also spills over into
the upstream part of the industry. A downstream output contraction implies that the
demand curve facing the upstream producers shifts inward, causing the equilibrium
wholesale price to decrease. Similarly, higher upstream taxes leads to a reduction
of upstream output, but part of such a tax increase spills over into the downstream
country through a higher wholesale price, causing also the retail price to increase.
20 We use subscript −i to denote the other exporting country than i. We will also, occasionally, refer
to countries i and −i as the ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ country, respectively.
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In effect, downstream taxes are partly paid by upstream firms, whereas upstream
taxes are partly paid by downstream firms and consumers. Conversely, a downstream
subsidy will partly benefit upstream firms, while an upstream subsidy partly benefits
downstream firms and consumers.
Equations 14 and 15 also indicate the scope for horizontal rent-shifting between
the exporting countries. By lowering the upstream tax rate tUi , the policy maker in
country i can induce the domestic firms to act more aggressively in the Cournot game,
as seen from Eq. 14. This induces a contraction of output from the foreign exporting
country, as seen from Eq. 15, the result being that some industry rents are shifted
from country −i to country i. Thus, for an exogenous downstream tax rate, the model
mirrors a ‘standard’ third-market model of strategic trade policy, along the lines of
Brander and Spencer (1985). From Eqs. 14 and 15, we can define a measure of this
horizontal rent-shifting effect as
gi := ∂ X−i/∂t
U
i
∂ Xi/∂tUi
= − m−i + s−iα
m−i + 1 + s−iα < 0. (18)
Since tUi only shifts the aggregate reaction function in country i , gi reflects the slope
of the reaction function in country −i. Note also that gi is less than one in absolute
value.
2.3 Stage 1: Optimal tax policies
We make the standard assumption that national policy makers maximise national
welfare, defined as the total surplus accruing to all agents situated in a given country.
2.3.1 Upstream tax policy
The policy makers in the exporting countries maximise the sum of post-tax upstream
profits plus tax revenue, which is equivalent to maximising pre-tax upstream profits.21
In country i, these are given by
WUi =
(
w
(
Q, n, tD
) − c) Xi (·) , (19)
where
Q =
2∑
i=1
Xi (·)
The first-order condition for optimal tax policy in country i is found by differentiating
Eq. 19 with respect to tUi , yielding
(
∂w (·)
∂ Q
Xi (·) + w (·) − c
)
∂ Xi (·)
∂tUi
+ ∂w (·)
∂ Q
∂ X−i (·)
∂tUi
Xi (·) = 0. (20)
21 Since we allow for negative tax rates, this definition of welfare relies on an implicit assumption
that the policy makers are able to raise funds for subsidy payments in a non-distortionary manner.
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Using the definition of gi from Eq. 18, we can rewrite Eq. 20 as
w (·) + XiwQ (1 + gi) − c = 0 (21)
We can then substitute for w (·) from Eq. 3, and let Xi = mix ji, to get
tUi =
(
− ∂w
∂ Q
)
(+)
x ji
(+)
[(mi − 1)
(0/+)
+ migi]
(+)(−)
. (22)
Equations 21 and 22 provide a neat illustration of the policy incentives dictating
the optimal upstream tax policy.22 Since the policy makers in the exporting countries
maximise pre-tax upstream profits, the strategic aim of the policy maker in country
i is to commit its country to the Stackelberg leader level of aggregate output,
as can deduced from Eq. 21. In principle, since aggregate output in country i is
monotonically increasing in mi, this can be accomplished by an appropriate degree
of intra-country competition, without using the tax instrument. However, when
the domestic market structure (mi) is not a policy variable, the policy maker can
correct a suboptimal market structure by using the tax instrument. The nature of
the optimal policy—whether a subsidy or a tax is used—depends then on the degree
of industry concentration in the domestic country. In the extreme case of no intra-
country competition (mi = 1), the domestic monopoly firm has no incentive, absent
taxation, to commit to the Stackelberg level of output. Consequently, the government
must offer a subsidy (tUi < 0) to increase the level of output. This is reflected by
the first term in the square brackets of Eq. 22 being zero, leaving the expression
unambiguously negative.
However, we see (when applying Eq. 18) that the expression in the square brackets
of Eq. 22 is increasing in mi and there is a cut-off value of mi where the expression
turns positive. In other words, if domestic industry concentration is low (mi is high),
aggregate output may exceed the Stackelberg level. In this case, the policy maker can
correct for the excessive degree of intra-country competition by taxing production in
order to move aggregate output down towards the desired Stackelberg level.23 With
respect to Eq. 22, this corresponds to a situation where, in the square brackets, the
first term is larger (in absolute value) than the second.
More exact results regarding the effect of market structure on upstream taxation
can be obtained by substituting for gi from Eq. 18 into Eq. 22, yielding
tUi =
(
− ∂w
∂ Q
)
(+)
(
x ji
m−i + 1 + s−iα
)
(+)
[
mi − (m−i + 1 + s−iα)
]
. (23)
The sign of the optimal tax rate is given by the sign of the expression in the square
brackets. Thus, from Eq. 23 we can summarise the above discussion by stating
22 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of reasoning.
23 This is also related to the so-called terms-of-trade motive for taxation as discussed by, e.g., Dixit
(1984) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
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the following results regarding the relationship between market structure and the
upstream tax policy:
Proposition 1 Given that m−i ≥ 1, the optimal upstream tax rate in country i is
(a) Negative if the degree of competition in country i is sufficiently low,
(b) Positive if the degree of competition in country i is sufficiently high, relative to the
degree of competition in country −i.
In addition to the above discussion, Proposition 1 also highlights the role of
the relative degree of industry concentration in the two exporting countries as a
determinant of the sign of the optimal tax rate. Increased competition in the foreign
country will reduce the market share of domestic firms, thus increasing the likelihood
of a subsidy being the optimal domestic policy.
2.3.2 Downstream tax policy
The policy maker in the importing country maximises the sum of consumers’ and
producers’ surplus, plus tax revenues. This is equivalent to the area underneath the
retail demand curve minus the costs of buying the consumed quantity of the good at
wholesale prices, and is thus given by
W D =
∫ Q(tD)
0
P (Q) dQ − w (Q (tD) , tD) Q (tD) , (24)
where
Q
(
tD
) =
2∑
i=1
Xi (·) .
The first-order condition for the optimal downstream tax rate is found by differenti-
ating Eq. 24 with respect to tD, yielding
[
P
(
Q
(
tD
)) − w (·)] ∂ Q
∂tD
− Q
[
∂w
∂ Q
∂ Q
∂tD
+ ∂w
∂tD
]
= 0. (25)
We can substitute out for P (·) − w (·) in Eq. 25 by using Eq. 2, and rearrange, to get
tD = Q
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
(−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(∂w/∂ Q)
(
∂ Q/∂tD
) + (∂w/∂tD)
∂ Q/∂tD
(−)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
+ qk
(+)
P ′ (Q)
(−)
. (26)
Equation 26 illustrates the different policy incentives dictating the optimal down-
stream tax policy. Two different considerations must be balanced. On the one hand,
the policy maker can extract some upstream rents by imposing a positive downstream
tax rate: an increase in tD will lower demand for the good and subsequently cause a
reduction in the wholesale price. This policy incentive is reflected by the first term on
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the right-hand side of Eq. 26, which is positive.24 On the other hand, considerations
for product market efficiency dictate that the policy maker should use a subsidy
to stimulate downstream competition, thereby increasing consumers’ surplus. This
policy incentive is reflected by the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. 26,
which is negative.
In order to say something more about the relative magnitudes of these two
offsetting effects, we can substitute from Eqs. 4, 5 and 16, and apply symmetry by
letting Q = nqk, to get
tD = −
(+)
qk
(−)
P ′ (Q)
m1 + m2
(+)
[(1 + α) (n + 1 + β) − (m1 + m2)] . (27)
The sign of the optimal tax rate is given by the sign of the expression in the square
brackets in Eq. 27. We can thus summarise the relationship between market structure
and the optimal downstream policy as follows:
Proposition 2 The optimal downstream tax rate is positive (negative) if the degree of
competition in the downstream part of the industry is sufficiently high (low), relative to
the degree of upstream competition.
The intuition is relatively straightforward. The incentive to extract upstream rents
depends on the ability of the downstream policy maker to affect the wholesale
price, which, in turn, requires a certain degree of upstream market power. Increased
competition in the upstream part of the industry makes the wholesale price less
sensitive to changes in the downstream tax rate, which weakens the rent-extraction
motive for downstream tax policy.25 The incentive for stimulating an efficient supply
of the good in the downstream market, on the other hand, is determined by the
degree of downstream competition. The lower the number of firms operating in
the downstream market, the stronger the incentives to reduce taxes (or increase
subsidies) in order to stimulate competition. Thus, the optimal balancing of the two
policy incentives depends on the relative number of upstream and downstream firms.
2.4 Linear demand
For the remainder of the analysis, we will consider the special case of linear
demand, which enables us to derive more results regarding the relationship between
industry concentration, optimal tax policies and welfare. Before deriving the explicit
24 Using Eqs. 4, 5 and 16, and remembering that α > −1, it is straightforward to show that the
numerator in the square brackets in Eq. 26 is negative, making the sign of the first term in Eq. 26
positive.
25 It is straightforward to show that
dw
dtD
= ∂w
∂ Q
∂ Q
∂tD
+ ∂w
∂tD
= − (1 + α)
m1 + m2 + 1 + α ,
implying that the effect of a downstream tax change on the wholesale price is stronger when upstream
competition is weaker.
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expressions for the equilibrium outcome, let us first pursue an interesting implication
of the linear demand assumption for the nature of the optimal trade policies. Setting
α = β = 0 in Eqs. 23 and 27, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 With linear demand, the sign of the optimal trade policy in either of the
countries depends only on market structure and is independent of foreign trade policy.
From Eqs. 23 and 27 we clearly see that, with linear demand, the sign of the
optimal tax rate—upstream or downstream—depends only on the market structure
parameters n, m1 and m2, and not on any level of output. This implies that the
decision of whether to tax or subsidise domestic production is independent of
whether or not foreign countries engage in strategic trade policy.26 Foreign trade
policy will affect the magnitude of the domestic policy—whether production should
be taxed (subsidised) with a ‘high’ or ‘low’ rate—but not the sign of the optimal policy
(i.e., whether production should be taxed or subsidised).27
Let us now derive the explicit expressions for the equilibrium outcome under the
linear demand assumption. We will distinguish between two different cases, where
either one or both of the exporting countries engage in strategic trade policy. This
distinction has not played any role for the results derived in the above analysis, but,
as we will see, it plays an important role in the analysis of the next section, where we
discuss the relationship between industry concentration and welfare.
Assume that the inverse demand function is given by P (Q) = a − Q. This implies,
of course, that β (Q) = α (Q) = 0, and explicit expression for output and prices in the
Cournot–Nash equilibrium are then easily derived. Equilibrium outputs of upstream
firms are given by
x ji = n
[
a − c − tD − tUi + m−i
(
tU−i − tUi
)]
(m1 + m2 + 1) (n + 1) , (28)
yielding an equilibrium total supply of
2∑
i=1
Xi = Q = n
[
(m1 + m2)
(
a − c − tD) − m1tU1 − m2tU2
]
(m1 + m2 + 1) (n + 1) , (29)
with corresponding wholesale and retail equilibrium prices given by
w = a − t
D + (m1 + m2) c + m1tU1 + m2tU2
(m1 + m2 + 1) (30)
and
P = (n + 1) a + (m1 + m2)
[
a + n (c + tD)] + n (m1tU1 + m2tU2
)
(m1 + m2 + 1) (n + 1) . (31)
Here we see more clearly that the structural richness of the model allows for
different standard assumptions to appear as special cases. For example, mi → ∞
26 An implicit assumption needed is that foreign trade policy does not affect market structure.
27 From Eq. 27 we also see that, if demand is non-linear but with constant concavity (i.e., β (Q) = β,
which implies α (Q) = α), the sign of the optimal downstream policy is unaffected by foreign trade
policy. However, as can be seen from Eq. 23, this does not hold for the optimal upstream policy.
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implies that downstream firms source their inputs from a perfectly competitive
upstream market in country i. In this case, the wholesale price is simply given by
w = c + tUi . On the other hand, n → ∞ implies that P = w + tD. In this case, our
model is equivalent to a standard trade model with foreign exporters selling directly
to consumers in the importing country, where tD corresponds to an import tariff.
Explicit expressions for the optimal trade policies in the two different versions of
the policy game are given below. For simplicity, we set tU−i = 0 in the case where the
foreign exporting country does not engage in strategic trade policy.
Case 1 Non-strategic behaviour by the policy maker in country -i:
tUi =
(m1 + m2) (mi − m−i − 1) (n + 1) (a − c)
mi
(
mi + n + 3m−i + 2min + 4m−in + 2mim−in + 2m2−in + 1
) , (32)
tD = (2m−i + 1) [n + 1 − (m1 + m2)] (a − c)
mi + n + 3m−i + 2min + 4m−in + 2mim−in + 2m2−in + 1
. (33)
Case 2 Strategic behaviour by all policy makers:
tUi =
(m1 + m2) (mi − m−i − 1) (n + 1) (a − c)
mi (2 (n + 1) + (m1 + m2) [2 (2n + 1) + (m1 + m2) n]) , (34)
tD = (m1 + m2 + 2) [1 + n − (m1 + m2)] (a − c)
2 (n + 1) + (m1 + m2) [2 (2n + 1) + (m1 + m2) n] . (35)
2.4.1 Comparative statics results
From Eqs. 32, 33, 34 and 35 we can derive the following comparative statics results
regarding the effect of market structure on the magnitude of optimal trade policy:
Proposition 4
1. In both Case 1 and Case 2,
(a) ∂tD/∂n > 0,
(b) ∂tUi /∂n < (>) 0 if mi > (<) m−i + 1,
(c) ∂tUi /∂m−i < 0,
(d) ∂tD/∂mi < 0.
2. In Case 1, ∂tUi /∂mi > 0, while in Case 2, ∂tUi /∂mi > (<) 0 if mi < (>) m, where
m > m−i + 1.
We see that the comparative statics results are, in qualitative terms, mostly
unaffected by whether one or both of the exporting countries engage in strategic
trade policy, and the intuition for the results follow quite straightforwardly from the
discussion of the different policy incentives in the more general analysis above.
Consider first an increase in downstream competition. This leads, unsurprisingly,
to an increase in downstream taxes, due to the reduced need to keep taxes low in
order to stimulate downstream competition. However, the effect on the upstream
tax rate in the domestic country is ambiguous. In fact, tUi will increase if mi <
m−i + 1, which implies that the equilibrium upstream tax rate is negative. This is
J Ind Compet Trade (2007) 7:31–52 45
a strategic response to changes in the downstream tax rate. When tUi < 0, export
market rivalry is the dominant force in determining domestic upstream tax policy.
An increase in downstream competition implies an increase of the downstream tax
rate, which reduces the wholesale price, and thereby the profitability of supplying
the export market. This reduces the incentives for using upstream subsidies to
capture downstream market shares, and the optimal upstream subsidy in country i
is correspondingly reduced.
Now consider an increase in upstream competition. Increased domestic competi-
tion (i.e., an increase in mi) has potentially different effects on the optimal policy in
country i, depending on whether or not country −i engages in strategic trade policy.
In Case 1, where the government in country −i does not act strategically, an increase
in mi will always lead to an increase in tUi . The reason is that increased competi-
tion in country i leads to an aggregate output expansion in this country, which the
policy maker wants to counteract by increasing the upstream tax rate, bringing aggre-
gate output back towards the Stackelberg leader level of output. In Case 2, though,
where all policy makers act strategically, increased domestic competition leads to
a reduction in the optimal tax rate, tUi , if the degree of competition is sufficiently
high to begin with. This is due to the strategic policy response from country −i.
Starting from a monopoly situation in country i (i.e., mi = 1), increased competition
will induce the policy maker in this country to increase taxes, as before. However,
increased competition in country i also triggers a tax reduction (or increased subsidy)
from the competing exporting country, which implies a loss of market share for
country i. If mi gets sufficiently large, the policy maker in country i is eventually
forced to reduce taxes in order to prevent the domestic firms being outcompeted by
foreign suppliers. The effect of increased domestic competition on downstream taxes,
however, is qualitatively similar in all cases. As previously explained, an increase in
mi reduces the effectiveness of using downstream taxes to shift rents down the value
chain; consequently, the downstream tax rate will decrease in equilibrium.
Finally, increased foreign competition to serve the export market (i.e., an increase
in m−i) will always provoke a tax reduction from the domestic upstream country.
The reduction in the market share of domestic firms, resulting from stronger foreign
competition, are counteracted by a lower domestic tax rate, bringing the aggregate
output back up towards the Stackelberg level.
3 Industry concentration and national welfare
How does increased competition in the upstream or downstream part of the industry
affect national welfare when national policy makers act strategically? Before looking
more closely into this question, let us first consider the laissez-faire (LF) policy as a
benchmark case. In order to facilitate the analysis, we retain the assumption of linear
demand.
With tUi = tD = 0, equilibrium expressions for national welfare are given by
WUi (LF) =
(m1 + m2) n (a − c)2
(m1 + m2 + 1)2 (n + 1)
(36)
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and
W D (LF) = (m1 + m2)
2 n (n + 2) (a − c)2
2 (m1 + m2 + 1)2 (n + 1)2
, (37)
from which it follows that
∂WUi (LF)
∂mi
< 0,
∂W D (LF)
∂mi
> 0,
∂WUi (LF)
∂n
> 0,
∂W D (LF)
∂n
> 0.
Increased upstream competition reduces upstream profits and benefits down-
stream firms (through a lower wholesale price) and consumers (through a lower retail
price). Increased downstream competition, on the other hand, benefits both coun-
tries, in terms of national welfare. Upstream firms benefit due to increased demand
from the downstream market. Downstream profits suffer, but this is outweighed by
an increase in consumers’ surplus.
These effects change, though, if national policy makers use tax instruments
strategically. As in the previous section, we will consider both the cases of strategic
and non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream policy maker.
3.1 Case 1: Non-strategic behaviour by policy maker in country −i
Using Eqs. 32 and 33, equilibrium expressions for social welfare in the exporting and
importing countries are given by
WUi =
(m1 + m2)2 (m−i + 1) (n + 1) n (a − c)2
(
mi + n + 3m−i + 2min + 4m−in + 2mim−in + 2m2−in + 1
)2 , (38)
WU−i =
(m1 + m2)2 m−i (n + 1) n (a − c)2
(
mi + n + 3m−i + 2min + 4m−in + 2mim−in + 2m2−in + 1
)2 , (39)
W D = (m1 + m2) (2m−i + 1)
2 [2 (n + 1) + (m1 + m2) n] n (a − c)2
2
(
mi + n + 3m−i + 2min + 4m−in + 2mim−in + 2m2−in + 1
)2 . (40)
From Eqs. 38, 39 and 40 we derive the welfare effects of increased competition:
Proposition 5 With non-strategic behaviour by the policy maker in country −i,
(a) ∂WUi /∂mi > 0,
(b) ∂WU−i/∂mi > 0,
(c) ∂W D/∂mi < 0,
(d) ∂WUi /∂n > 0 if m−i = 0 or n < n,
∂WUi /∂n < 0 if m−i > 0 and n > n, where
n := mi + 3m−i + 1
2m−i (m1 + m2 − 1) − 1
(e) ∂W D/∂n > 0.
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The introduction of strategic trade policy leads to a surprising result with respect
to industry concentration in the upstream part of the industry. Contrary to the
benchmark case, increased upstream competition in the domestic country actually
benefits the domestic country (and the competing foreign country), while harming
the downstream country, in terms of social welfare. If we decompose the effect of
an increase in mi, we find that domestic upstream firms lose, while downstream firms
and consumers benefit, as in the benchmark case. What happens, though, is that tax
revenues are shifted upstream.
The intuition is related to the optimal tax responses to an increase in upstream
competition. For clarity of discussion, consider first the special case of m−i = 0,
which corresponds to either a single exporting country or international coordination
of tax policies across exporting countries.28 From Proposition 4 we know that an
increase in the number of upstream suppliers leads to increased upstream taxes, while
downstream taxes are reduced. As previously argued, stronger upstream competition
reduces the rent-extraction incentive for the downstream policy maker, leading to a
lower downstream tax rate. Although total output increases, the possibility of shifting
rents downstream is reduced, and downstream welfare drops as a consequence.
Upstream welfare increases for the same reason. Increased upstream competition
means that less rents are shifted downwards in the value-chain, while the domestic
upstream policy maker optimally increases the tax rate to correct for the negative
competition externality.
Perhaps surprisingly, these results are not qualitatively affected by the presence of
foreign upstream competition (i.e., m−i > 0), which, all else equal, puts a downward
pressure on upstream taxes. If m−i > 0, a higher upstream tax rate in the domestic
country implies a loss of market shares to foreign firms. Thus, increased competition
in country i clearly benefits country −i, as can be verified from Eq. 39. Even so, this
horizontal rent-shifting from the domestic to the foreign upstream country is not
outweighed by the vertical rent-shifting from the importing country, implying that
both exporting countries benefit from increased upstream competition.
This result is in sharp contrast to the notion that complete cartelisation is always
beneficiary for an exporting country with no domestic consumption of the good.29
The reason is simply that cartelisation has two opposing effects on upstream welfare.
On the one hand, it reduces (or eliminates) the negative competition externality,
which is the intended effect. On the other hand, though, it increases the amount
of rents available for extraction by downstream policy makers. To the extent that
mi is a choice variable for the domestic upstream policy maker, it is better to
increase mi—thereby reducing the scope for rent-extraction—and instead use the
tax instrument indirectly to regulate the upstream oligopoly. An increase in mi is
optimally accompanied by an increase in tUi , which triggers a reduction in t
D. We can
think of this as the domestic, rather than a foreign, policy maker taxing away the
domestic rents.
What about the welfare effects of increased downstream competition? As in the
laissez-faire benchmark, increased downstream competition benefits the importing
country. However, in contrast to the benchmark, the domestic exporting country
28 As mentioned in the Introduction, Cowan (1989) considers a tax policy game in a model that is
equivalent to m−i = 0 and n → ∞ in our model.
29 See, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1984).
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might suffer. From part (d) of Proposition 5, we see that this is the case if there
is foreign upstream competition (m−i > 0) and the number of downstream firms is
above a critical level n ≤ 5.30 This is due to the policy response of the importing
country.31 Higher downstream competition has two opposing effects on upstream
welfare: it increases demand from the downstream market, which benefits upstream
firms, but it also induces a downstream tax increase, which has the opposite effect.
The total effect on upstream welfare depends thus on the relative strength of these
two effects. If the domestic exporting country is the single supplier of the good to
the downstream market, the first effect always dominates. However, competition
from a second exporting country puts a downward pressure on upstream taxes,
which increases upstream rents and thus the incentive for rent-extracting taxation
in the importing country. Consequently, the downstream tax response to increased
competition in the downstream market is stronger when the good is supplied from
two exporting countries. If n gets sufficiently large, this is enough to make the overall
effect on upstream welfare negative.
3.2 Case 2: Strategic behaviour by all policy makers
To what extent is the relationship between national welfare and industry concentra-
tion dependent on a (lack of) policy response from the foreign exporting country?
If the policy makers in both exporting countries act strategically, explicit expressions
for social welfare in the policy equilibrium are given by
WUi =
(m1 + m2)2 (m−i + 1) (n + 1) n (a − c)2
(2 (n + 1) + (m1 + m2) [2 (2n + 1) + (m1 + m2) n])2
, (41)
W D = (m1 + m2 + 2)
2 (m1 + m2) [2 (n + 1) + (m1 + m2) n] n (a − c)2
2 (2 (n + 1) + (m1 + m2) [2 (2n + 1) + (m1 + m2) n])2
. (42)
The relationship between industry concentration and welfare in the different parts
of the vertical industry is outlined in the final proposition of the paper:
Proposition 6 With strategic behaviour by all policy makers,
(a) ∂WUi /∂mi < 0,
(b) ∂WUi /∂m−i > (<) 0 if m−i < (>) m̂, where m̂ > mi.
(c) ∂W D/∂mi > 0,
(d) ∂WUi /∂n > (<) 0 if n < (>) n̂, where
n̂ := 2 (m1 + m2 + 1)
(m1 + m2)2 − 2
.
(e) ∂W D/∂n > 0.
30 Since n is monotonically decreasing in m1 and m2, it follows that n ≤ 5 for all permissible values
of m1 and m2.
31 It can easily be shown that, with non-strategic behaviour by the downstream policy maker,
increased downstream competition will always benefit the exporting countries.
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From part (a) of the proposition we see that the previous relationship between
competition and welfare in the upstream market is now reversed. This is due to
the policy competition between the exporting countries. When the policy makers in
both exporting countries act strategically, increased upstream competition in country
i triggers a tax reduction in the competing upstream country (cf. Proposition 4), with
a subsequent reduction in export market shares, and thus welfare, in country i.
However, increased competition in one exporting country might increase welfare
in the other exporting country, as part (b) of Proposition 6 suggests.32 This raises the
question of whether the previously derived positive relationship between upstream
competition and welfare might be restored—even in the case of policy competition
between rivaling exporting countries—if we consider a simultaneous liberalisation of
both upstream markets. From Eq. 41, we derive
∂WUi
∂mi
+ ∂W
U
i
∂m−i
= i (m1 + m2) (n + 1) n (a − c)
2
(2 (n + 1) + (m1 + m2) [2 (2n + 1) + n (m1 + m2)])3
,
where
i = 2 (4 + mi + 5m−i) (n + 1) + (m1 + m2)2
[
2 + n (mi − 3m−i)
]
.
An exporting country will lose from increased competition in its own country, but
gain from increased competition in the rivaling upstream country. The net gain is
determined by the sign of i, which is ambiguous. In general, we see that country
i will always benefit from increased competition in both upstream markets if mi is,
and remains, sufficiently larger than m−i, which suggests that only one country—if
any at all—will stand to gain. This is also generally the case, although numerical
simulations suggest that both countries might benefit if the degree of concentration
is, and remains, at a very high level.33
Finally, we can observe—from part (d) of Proposition 6—that the potential for
exporting countries being adversely affected by a more competitive downstream
market is reinforced, compared with the analysis in the previous sub-section. Now,
increased downstream competition will hurt exporting countries if the number of
downstream firms is larger than n̂ ≤ 3. Strategic trade policy by both exporting
countries puts an additional downward pressure on upstream taxes, which reinforces
the incentive for rent-extracting taxation in the importing country, implying that
the downstream tax response to increased downstream competition is even stronger
than in the previous case. This consequently increases the likelihood that a more
competitive downstream market will hurt the exporting countries.
32 From Eq. 41 we have that
∂WUi
∂m−i
= (a − c)
2 (n + 1) n (m1 + m2)
[
i + n (mi − m−i) (m1 + m2)2
]
(2 (n + 1) + (m1 + m2) (2 (2n + 1) + n (m1 + m2)))3
,
where
i := 2
(
2 + mi + 3m−i + (m1 + m2)2
)
(n + 1) > 0.
We see that mi ≥ m−i is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for ∂WUi /∂m−i > 0.
33 For the special case of m1 = m2, numerical simulations seem to confirm that going from one to
two firms in each exporting country increases welfare in both, whereas an increase from two to three
is only beneficial if there is a downstream monopoly (n = 1). An increase in the number of firms
beyond three in each country is not beneficial for any of the exporting countries.
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Table 1 Welfare effects of increased competition.
mi ↑ n ↑
LF Case 1 Case 2 LF Case 1 Case 2
WUi ÷ + ÷ + +/÷ +/÷
W D + ÷ + + + +
A summary of some of the most important results from this section is given in
Table 1 above.
4 Concluding remarks
We have presented a comprehensive analysis of tax policy competition between
exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries, using a model of
successive international Cournot oligopoly, with a particular emphasis on how the
degree of concentration in the different parts of the industry affects the distribution
of rents among the countries. Here we will not recapitulate all results of the paper,
but rather provide some final thoughts and elaborations on a couple of our main
findings regarding the welfare effects of increased competition in the industry.
Elaborating on and extending a similar result in the previous literature, we have
shown that a more competitive upstream market can benefit an exporting (upstream)
country, while hurting the importing (downstream) country. In our model, this result
holds even in the case of supply from a second exporting country, provided that
the policy maker in this country acts non-strategically. When both upstream policy
makers engage in strategic trade policy, though, the result is generally reversed,
although increased competition in both upstream countries might benefit both
exporting countries in a few special cases. If the exporting countries were able
perfectly to collude on their tax policies, though, we would effectually be back in
the equilibrium where only one exporting country acts strategically. This has some
interesting implications with respect to, for example, the optimal strategy of an
international cartel like OPEC. To the extent that a tax response from importing
countries can be spurred, it might be more important (i.e., profitable) for the OPEC
countries to coordinate their tax policies, rather than their export volumes.
We also find that a more competitive downstream industry may in fact hurt
exporting countries when policy makers act strategically. In our particular model, in
the case of strategic behaviour by all involved countries, this will be always happen
whenever the number of domestic firms exceeds three. This result suggests that the
use of strategic trade policy is likely to increase the conflict of interest, with respect to
competition policies, between exporting and importing countries. In the case referred
to above, the conflict of interest is close to complete: the importing country would like
to stimulate competition in all parts of the industry, whereas the exporting countries
have generally the exact opposite interests.
It should be emphasized that our results in the welfare section depends crucially on
the assumption that the downstream policy maker engages in strategic trade policy.
If this is not the case, it can be shown that, in the case of m−i = 0, increased upstream
competition in country i has no effect on welfare either upstream or downstream.
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The reason is simply that, with no foreign policy response, mi and tUi are perfect
policy substitutes for the upstream policy maker. An increase in mi can therefore be
perfectly compensated by an increase in tUi , leaving equilibrium output unaffected.
However, in the case of m−i > 0, an increase in mi can be shown to harm the
domestic upstream country while benefitting both other countries. The reason is that
more competition in country i will provoke a tax reduction in the other exporting
country, leading to lower output in country i, but higher aggregate output in the
whole industry.
Finally, we should also emphasize that, in order to increase the richness of our
analysis, relative to the received literature, generality of functional forms has to a
certain extent—particularly in the welfare section—been sacrificed to the benefit of
higher structural generality. Thus, we cannot claim a high degree of generality for
all of our results. We do, however, believe that the main mechanisms at work apply
to a wider class of demand and cost functions than the linear specifications. Besides,
in the cases where opposing forces produce ambiguous results, these will obviously
persist under more general demand and cost assumptions.
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